Abu Bakr Al-Baghadi: The former leader of Islamic State, he was killed by a U.S special forces operation in Idlib in October, 2019.
Ibrahim al-Samarra'i, known by his nom de guerre Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has experienced multiple deaths as leader of Islamic State. However, after a raid conducted on a compound in Idlib in northern Syria by U.S special forces and Syrian Democratic Forces, President Trump confirmed that Baghdadi, the world’s number one terrorist is finally dead. It appears that this time there will be no more resurrections or comebacks by the mysterious man and self-proclaimed caliph who terrorised the Middle East for nearly a decade.
Like the ultra-conservative and literalist leaders of Al-Qa'ida, Ayman Zawahiri and former leader Osama Bin Laden, Al-Samarra’i came from a highly educated background. He undertook Islamic studies and history at the University of Baghdad where alongside his dedication to his studies he became a teacher, an intellectual, and a preacher at mosques across Baghdad. He obtained a doctorate at Islamic University in Baghdad and became known to many as Dr Ibrahim.
All these factors painted Al-Samarra'i as a deeply conservative individual who grew up during the years of savage dictatorship under Saddam Hussein, the Iraq-Iran War (1980 –1988), the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) and American meddling in Iraq dating back as far back at the 1960s. The Second Gulf War destroyed critical infrastructure such as hospitals, roads, bridges and water treatment plants and Saddam Hussein’s regime was placed under sanctions by the United States which led to the starvation of thousands of Iraqi civilians under President Clinton. Al-Samarra'i's deep-seated hatred of the West - not uncommon in Iraq during the 1990s - may have begun during this period of instability in Iraq as America propped up Saddam’s Baathist dictatorship despite their knowledge of his use of chemical weapons against the Iranians and Kurds. What mattered to the U.S was that even if Saddam was a volatile agent, he was an effective deterrent to the Soviet Union's influence, a check against 1979 Iranian revolution, and he secured vital Western oil interests during the twilight years of the Cold War.
In 1999, following his release from prison in Jordan, the former leader of Islamic State, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi returned to Afghanistan. According to Arab Monitor, he and Al-Samarra'i began to live and work together, operating as close partners in Kabul and Herat. Al-Samarra'i had close relations with the Taliban during his years in Afghanistan, as did Zarqawi. The two Arabs shared the Taliban's sectarian hatred of Iranians and Shiites. Clearly, Al-Samarra'i did not emerge from the shadow following Zarqawi's death in June, 2006. His association with the creation of Islamic State's violent pan-Islamic nationalism and militant Salafi-jihadist doctrine started in Afghanistan where Zarqawi would establish a frosty relationship with Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri. This strained relationship was circumvented by short-term necessities as Bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida funded their operations in Afghanistan but later exploded into a direct conflict between Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State in Syria's civil war.
Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S-led forces, Al-Samarra'i and Zaqarwi used Iraq's insurgency against U.S occupation forces to their advantage. In 2004, he was captured by American forces and spent the next nine months a prisoner in the Bucca Camp, a U.S detention centre in southern Iraq. Bucca Camp became an incubator for jihād and a meeting of interests where 'Saddam Hussein’s Baathist secularists and Islamist fundamentalists were thrust together and set the stage for something perhaps worse: collaboration.'
Incarceration and the deeply unpopular occupation of Iraq by coalition combat troops helped Al-Samarra'i forge a deadly alliance between neo-Wahabbists, neo-Salafist extremists, alienated Sunni tribes, and the deposed president's demobilised military in Iraq. Following the re-branding of Zarqawi’s ultra-violent movement as the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, Al-Samarra'i who renamed himself as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi eventually became the supervisor of the Islamic State of Iraq’s sharia committee and a key member of the group’s senior consultative council.
The difference between Zarqawi and Baghdadi became clear during the Iraqi insurgency against the occupation. Zarqawi was an effective insurgent and charismatic but a poor strategist and could not realise his brutal ideological vision for Iraq and Syria. His murderous approach alienated crucial Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi tribal networks in Anbar and northern Iraq who formed the backbone of Islamic State’s ability to conduct operations in Iraq. Baghdadi and Zarqawi both ruled through fear, but the latter did not incorporate the delicate political and economic interests of local insurgents, tribes and clans into his plan. The violence against Shiites also drew criticism from allies abroad including Bin Laden and Zawahiri who were troubled by the autonomy of Zarqawi's network.
"We must repeat what we mentioned previously, that the majority of Muslims don't comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shi'a. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques....My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue."
Baghdadi's disdain for Iraq's Shiite-dominated government was undisputed but he understood, as did Saddam, the fundamental importance of maintaining a system of terror and enticement, dependence and conformity, and maintaining a strong network of patrons and clients. These pillars formed the backbone of Saddam's regime in its final decade in power following Washington's obliteration of Iraq's socio-economic fabric and infrastructure during the Second Gulf War and the international sanctions imposed on Saddam's regime during the 1990s. As an Iraqi and coming from a tribe with strong links to the former Ba'athist regime, Baghdadi understanding of these networks were superior to that of Zarqawi who had a reputation as a sectarian, genocidal psychopath, an uncompromising foreign fighter who came from a background of poor education and petty crime.
Zarqawi gradually gave the U.S military the chance to forces Islamic State of Iraq underground. It also led to Zarqawi's death, as senior American sources said that key assistance in hunting down and killing Zarqawi came from dissident Iraqi Sunnis who were growing wary (and weary) about the consequences of tolerating his indiscriminate violence. Zarqawi's coalition of fighters were too extreme, even for Sunni nationalists who hated the U.S occupation as it isolated them from any potential political process in Iraq. Following his death, the U.S military under General Petraeus diminished Islamic State of Iraq’s power and influence during the Surge and its leadership was decimated by U.S Special Forces under the jurisdiction of the Obama administration. This reached its climax on April 18th, 2010 when the new leaders of Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi, were eliminated. This power vacuum allowed Baghdadi to increase his influence as the Baathists and jihādist groups regrouped.
Baghdadi's Islamic State learnt its lessons from the Taliban and the eventual strategic failing of Zarqawi during General Petraeus's Surge. Islamic State took Zarqawi's legacy of violence to a new level while it carefully folded itself into local and regional conflicts and exploited Syria and Iraq's war economies. Those who disagreed with Baghdadi's doctrine remained targets including Shiites, Alawites, Yezidis and non-Islamist Sunnis, however, Islamic State’s coalition (at-least at first) were careful not to assassinate or target Sunni tribal leaders which, under long-existing tribal codes, would invite retribution, revenge attacks and lose Islamic State crucial political allies on the ground.
In the long-term, politically, economically and militarily, Islamic State could not survive as a self-declared state, even with the support of many Sunni tribes in Iraq. It outlived its use as a proxy to regional powers and systematically turned many local, regional and global powers against it while being opposed by ideological affiliates such as Al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, Hayet Tahrir Al-Sham and other jihādist groups across the Middle East. Pro-Islamic State groups across the world have had mixed successes, tied in-part to local, political and cultural factors at play where they operate in Afghanistan Lake Chad, Nigeria and the Philippines.
With his death, removing Baghdadi from the picture will not end Islamic State’s inspired insurgencies in other parts of the world including Nigeria, the Egyptian Sinai, Libya, Chechnya nor will it quell the cells abroad singling out international targets and cities to conduct retributive terrorist attacks. The impact of Baghdadi as a symbol for Islamic State’s brutal campaign like that of Zarqawi cannot be underestimated.
Islamic State has terrorised the international community and the Middle East and inspired thousands of men, women and children to join their twisted war. Baghdadi’s genocidal zeal surpassed that of Zarqawi and his campaigns of ethnic cleansing and genocide inspired multiple atrocities, crimes against humanity, produced graphic snuff-videos of torture and extreme bloodshed. Baghdadi’s created a sub-state, took the concept of digital jihād to a new level of reach and influence, and carried out spectacular terrorist attacks across the world in the name of global jihād.
The legacy of Baghdadism and Zarqawism will endure and will inspire more young men and women to conduct terrorist attacks and atrocities across the world. Though President Trump will claim victory, the ideology of militant Salafi-jihadism will endure. The U.S occupation and poor governance across the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa has catalysed the rise of jihādism. The devastating result of the campaigns to dislodge Islamic State from Syria and Iraq’s cities and towns have scattered fighters across the region in search of new areas to seek haven and exploit local grievances including the Sahel region, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.
Ironically, President Trump's success of "bombing the s**t out of IS" has helped to potentially radicalise the next generation. The brutality of U.S airpower has gained greater scrutiny over time and proved to be as lethal as Russian airstrikes since Vladimir Putin's came to aid of President Assad in 2015. Deadly drone and airstrikes in Manbij, Ibn al-Khatab's mosque, a school in Raqqa, and Jadida neighbourhood of West Mosul, four incidents alone, killed an estimated three hundred people. The New York Times and AirWars have alleged that U.S airstrikes have resulted in the deaths of a minimum of 4,118 Syrian civilians since 2014 while Russia's bombing campaign has believed to have killed an estimated 4,557 Syrian men, women and children. The numbers demonstrate that international interventions - while different in their objectives - have yielded similar costs.
The perspective of the Israeli military and intelligence - Washington's closest ally in the region and who are well-rehearsed in the turbulent nature of Middle Eastern politics and war - should be noted by Western commentators. The Trump administration does not understand the nuances of the Middle East’s conflict, nor the historical factors which drive them. As an Israeli intelligence officer stated in an interview with Bryan Bender for Politico Magazine:
Of-course, the U.S and Russian militaries are not the sole forces driving instability and radicalisation. As Christopher Phillips astutely points out Islamic State is the offspring of many parents. "Through a mixture of bungling, short-termism, indirect and intentional policies, the West, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (and the Iraqi government) all played a role. "Assad, Russia and their allies have also played a role in Islamic State's rise" including Iran's support for "Shiite militia established by Qassem Suleimani, Commander of the Iranian Quds Force, to resist the U.S occupation of Iraq in the 2000s" many of which were driven by sectarian politics which alienated Iraqi Sunnis.
Even without a key figurehead Islamic State remains deadly in Iraq and Syria and whether or not 2014 represented the organisation's peak, their ideological strength remains potent. "IS is much like a cancer," an intelligence officer at the IDF's Northern Command said. “It is easy to cut the tumors off. But how do you prevent the small cancer cells from expanding? I think the caliphate is already thinking, ‘OK, what are we going to do next?’"
Outside the conflict with IS, it is clear the organisation are not the only threat, despite their brutality and despite all the international attention they have received. Baghdadi's soldiers have served to cloak other dangers to regional and global stability. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, and Nur al-Din al-Zenki have all successfully hijacked the Syrian revolution, one now dominated, at-least militarily, by extremists after Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State, the Gulf States, Turkey, Assad and the Russians all contributed in part to the destruction of the moderate opposition in Syria.
The fall-out of the Arab revolutions has sparked the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War and Western states and Russia have both directly intervened in or covertly fuelled the turmoil in several countries with the support of a plethora of state and non-state actors. Old borders have deteriorated, new sub-states and governments have emerged and collapsed, unprecedented demographic changes are reshaping the social fabric of the region and rebellion and insurgency has been met with brutal counter-revolution all of which have catalysed "one of the most significant socio-religious movements in politics today": militant Salafi jihādism.
Without a common enemy in Islamic State, other conflicts have taken the spotlight in the war-zones across the Middle East which are now arenas for complex rivalries. The Israelis and Saudi Arabians have found common ground diplomatically in their long-standing contest with the Iranian regime and Turkey, once a shield for NATO's European states in the Middle East has become disenchanted with its Western allies with their approach to the crises in Iraq, Syria and their military alliance with Kurdish groups such as the YPG and PKK. The result has pushed Turkey into renewed conflict with the Kurds and forced them to pursue closer ties with Russia and Iran.
Relations between Middle Eastern states are now deeply unstable and unpredictable and the arms race in the region has gained considerable momentum since the Arab Revolutions largely descended into chaos. "The arms sales in the region have reached $215 billion and this is no small sum,” said Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman grimly and international arms deals are clearly worsening the issue, even for close allies such as Israel. Hizbollah's intervention in Iraq and Syria, costly in manpower, has still helped to strengthen the military wing of the Lebanese political party. The threat of Shiite extremism and terrorism, more organised and systematic, has been undercut by the dominant narrative of Sunni-led violence promoted by IS propaganda and fuelled by international media's attention to it.
In December 2016, a senior military official in Israel raised his concerns on Hizbullah using the U.S - made armoured personnel carriers in Syria supplied by the Lebanese army. With weapons disappearing on the black market and the U.S military admitting that it leaked $1 billion worth of armaments and weapons in Iraq and Kuwait, reclaiming lost hardware will be a monumental challenge including preventing the military equipment falling into the hands of those who are (and will) committing atrocities. Islamic State's arsenal was designed or manufactured in more than 25 countries who poured armaments into the country while Amnesty International detailed report illustrates how the U.S, Europe, Russia and Iran arms industries have been pouring military support into the coffers of the Popular Mobilisation Units and Iraqi Security Forces currently slaughtering protesters in Iraq. Many of these paramilitaries have conducted ethnic cleansing, kidnappings, torture, conducted human rights violations with impunity and committed war crimes.
Crises in Turkey and Libya continue to develop with rapid seriousness. Egypt remains in the grip of military rule while Hamas-controlled Gaza remains sandwiched between Israeli and Egyptian forces by air, land and sea, a siege which could render Gaza uninhabitable by 2020. These are all geo-political issues which could plunge the region into further violence and turmoil, violence which dwarfs the chaos unleashed by Islamic State. Protests have swept Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq, and Syria remains paralysed by civil war. Yemen’s war has created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis with millions threatened by famine.
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's demise is an important victory against a genocidal organisation but it achieves little in solving the Middle East’s multi-dimensional crisis, a series of Middle Eastern wars and revolutions where "everything is connected" across the region. The last century of Middle Eastern politics and history, not just current affairs, has continued to demonstrate this simple fact. The reactive responses to the Middle Eastern wars and Arab Revolutions, including the war with Islamic State, will leave international policymakers with a deep sense of regret and they will be unprepared for what happens in the near future. What happens next is best summarised by an Israeli intelligence official: "The worst is yet to come."