ORWA AJJOUB & MATT H.C.K WILLIAMS
Operation Spring of Peace has poured fuel on the enduring and bloody civil war in Syria. The offensive - conducted swiftly and ruthlessly by Turkish Armed Forces and their proxies in Syria - has shook the region and delivered another critical blow to the Syrian Kurds’ fighting forces, their supporters inside Syria and the mini-state of Rojava.
Following President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw America’s troops from north eastern Syria and abandoning the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an essential actor in fighting Islamic State, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the start of the Turkish military operation in north eastern Syria under the name of ‘Spring of Peace’. On 10th October, Turkish military jets conducted airstrikes in three different areas; Ras Al Ain City, Al-Hasakeh Governorate, Tell Abiad city and its outskirts. Spring of Peace has been carried out by the Turkish army and the Turkish-backed ‘Syrian National Army’.
Events have moved swiftly since the incursion began in early October. Sanctions have been imposed on Turkey by the United States then lifted while Turkey and Russia have hammered out another agreement in Sochi as Erdogan and Russia's president Vladimir Putin agreed to establish another “safe zone” (30 km in depth) inside Syria. Hundreds of civilians and soldiers - predominantly members of the SDF and People’s Protections Units (YPG) - have been killed, and war crimes have been committed. Thousands of Syrian Kurds have been displaced across the north of the war-torn country. Water supplies were cut and phosphorus munitions were reportedly deployed and Turkish supported proxies have committed several high-profile executions of Kurdish politicians and civilians.
In the build-up to the campaign, important events had been developing in the lead-up to Spring of Peace. The offensive came after Syrian opposition figures Abdurrahman Mustafa (head of the Syrian interim government) and Salim Idris (defense minister) announced the merger of two armed opposition entities supported by Turkey: the National Army (NA), based in northwest Aleppo, and the National Liberation Front (NLF) on 4th October. [1] Based in Idlib and its countryside, each of them went through different phases whereby new factions joined or left. To answer questions regarding their formation, reconfiguration, and relationship with Turkey, one needs to understand the context in which the groups were established.
Who are the ‘National Army’?
The story began in August 2016 when Turkey launched its first military incursion into the northern border of Syria, dubbed Operation Euphrates Shield. The offensive was driven by two main goals: pushing Islamic State out of the strategic city of Jarablus, which the group had controlled since January 2014; and containing the Kurdish’s presence along Turkey’s southern borders.[2] At the time, Ankara’s concern was largely based on the assumption that should the YPG and the SDF gain control of Jarablus, they would be able to connect the two Kurdish ruled cantons of Kobane in the east and Afrin in the west. In other words, the Kurds would control the whole border between Turkey and Syria, threatening to establish their dream of a state.
It was during the military preparation for Euphrates Shield that the incubation of the National Army began. The Turkish operation, which lasted until March 2017, achieved its initial goal by pushing Kurdish fighters out of the cities of Azaz and Al-Bab in north and north east Aleppo, respectively. Ankara’s decision to include local Syrian national factions in Euphrates Shield, however, was likely driven by three factors. First, most of these factions come from the middle and northern part of Syria; meaning their knowledge of the geography and relationship with local populations were valuable on the ground. Second, by assigning these factions to the front-lines of the battles against Kurdish fighters, the Turkish army’s losses in terms of troops were minimised. Finally, by pulling the strings of the historical ethnic animosity between Arab and Kurds. Ankara could incentivise the factions to join Euphrates Shield.
According to SETA, a think tank based in Ankara, the groups in the Turkey-aligned Syrian opposition that participated in Euphrates Shield were Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Tahrir, Al-Mutasim Brigade, the Salahaddin Brigade, the Hamza Division, and the Sultan Murad Division.[3] All of these factions are often referred to by the media as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Nonetheless, this categorisation is problematic as no effective leadership, clear hierarchy, or organized efforts have existed within the ranks of those who claim to belong to the FSA. As Aron Lund pointed out: “In reality, what was emerging [the FSA] was a sprawling leaderless resistance of local fighters who shared only some common goals and an assemblage of FSA-inspired symbols.”[4]
Two other significant groups that took part in Euphrates Shield were the Al-Sham Legion and Al-Jabha al-Shamiya (The Levant Front), according to the Clingendael Institute of International Relations.[5] Al-Sham Legion is an umbrella organisation of 19 relatively small Islamist groups formed in March 2014.[6] The Levant Front is be considered one of largest alliances of the Syrian armed opposition in Aleppo, including the Islamic Front in Aleppo, the Noureddine al-Zinki Brigades, the Mujahideen Army, the Fastaqim Kama Umirta Gathering, and the Asala wa-Tanmiya Front.[7]
Image via @DefenseUnits
Although Turkey is their main backer, along with Qatar, the ideological spectrum is wide and includes not only Muslim Brotherhood-influenced groups such as al-Sham Legion Jaysh and the Levant Front, but also hard-line Salafi factions such as al-Ahrar al-Sham and al-Zinki. As for the Sultan Murad Division, whose fighters are Turkmen—an ethnic minority with Turkish origin who share a significant part of their culture with Turkey—its alignment with Turkey is largely driven by the group’s national sense of Neo-Ottomanism.[8] This is a Turkish political ideology that call for larger political engagement of Turkey within regions formerly under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.
Almost a year after Euphrates Shield, Turkey carried out another military offensive into Syria territories under the name Operation Olive Branch. Emboldened by the Russian green light and the unwillingness of the United States to hinder its military advances, Turkey’s Olive Branch was meant to eradicate the YPG from the northwestern canton of Afrin and “hand the city to its original owners [the Arabs]”, according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[9] By including all the mentioned factions in its both offensives, Ankara’s control over almost half of the northern border line was apparent by the beginning of 2018.
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT: THE BATTLE FOR IDLIB
After its success in uniting many Syrian armed factions and embroiling them in its battle against Kurdish fighters, Ankara’s gaze shifted towards Idlib, which hosts almost three million civilians, including internally displaced persons from different cities in the country. Should the Syrian Arab Army and Russian forces attack Idlib, Turkey will be their only destination. This is a concern that Ankara takes seriously, especially after a flood of thousands of Syrian refugees which fled to its borders following President Bashar Assad and the Russians’ recent offensive in late April 2019.[10]
Additionally, Ankara is aware of the strategic significance of Idlib for Assad, who has been relentlessly trying to bring it back under his rule. For Assad, control over the M5 highway which connects the cities of Hama and Aleppo, and the M4 highway which connects the cities of Latakia and Aleppo, are of great strategic concern. If viewed as a bargaining chip by Turkey, Idlib could be leveraged not only for concessions regarding Spring of Peace, but to ensure Turkish influence in any future political processes in Syria.
To secure Idlib, a new umbrella group of the non-jihadist Islamist armed factions in Idlib was formed with Turkey’s support under the name The National Liberation Front (NFL) in May 2018. The new platform included Turkey’s preferred faction, the al-Sham Legion, and another ten groups based in Idlib: The Free Army of Idlib, The First and the Second Coastal Brigades, The First Brigade, The Second Army, The Elite Army, The Victory Army, The Brigade of the Islamic Martyrs of Daria, The Brigade of Freedom, and the 23 Division.[11] In August of the same year, the Syria Liberation Front, which consisted of Ahrar al-Sham and al-Zinki along with the Suqour al-Sham Brigades, announced a merger with the NLF.
Looking at the factional map in northern Syria, one can easily notice that Turkey has managed to control all non-jihadist Islamist armed groups. In Idlib, however, there also exists three other jihadi groups which have not taken part in Turkey’s military operation during the Syrian conflict.
First, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which severed its ties with Islamic State in 2013 and Al-Qa’ida in 2017, whose leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani implicitly blessed the Turkish incursions against the Kurds after describing them as “The enemy of the revolution.”[12] The relationship between the two actors can be best described as cautious, and both depend on each other to different degrees.[13] As Sultan Al Kanj of Chatham House put it: “HTS needs political cover both regionally and internationally to protect it from being targeted as a terrorist group. Turkey needs ties to an armed group with military and organizational discipline that is able to control the territory and that is not subordinate to any foreign power.”[14]
Another two Salafi jihadist groups have shown no sign of co-operation with Turkey. Hurass al-Din, an Al-Qa’ida loyalist group, was formed by prominent al-Qaeda loyalists who split from HTS after it broke its ties with Al-Qa’ida. The Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria (TIP) consists mostly of Uighur Chinese militants and has links with the international Turkistan Islamic Party, which is devoted to establishing an Islamist state in China’s western Xinjiang province. The TIP has been an effective ally for HTS against its local rivals and some claim that it has secretly given an oath of allegiance to al-Jolani.[15]
Turkey’s ability to harness the majority of the oppositions armed groups in northern Syria cannot be overstated, as it will deepen the ethnic fissure between Arabs and Kurds for decades. On the other hand, while the NA is busy fighting for Ankara’s interests, HTS has been consolidating its military presence in Idlib as the next battle with Assad is looming. As the Kurds were left disappointed by the US’s withdrawal from northern Syria - which gave Turkey the green light to attack them - the NA will most probably face the same fate as soon as the new Idlib deal between Russia and Turkey reveals itself.
A Trumpian Betrayal
The displacement of over 170,000 Syrian Kurds in northern Syria comes after Erdogan’s initiated plans to ‘restore the region's demographic structure’ of northern Syria in the so-called “safe zone”. The term has become a substitute term for ethnic cleansing, not dissimilar to population swaps undertaken by the Assad government and Iranians throughout the Syrian Civil War. [16]
President Donald Trump’s stance on the crisis has come under scrutiny at home and abroad. The president’s sudden decision to withdraw American forces from the Syrian war zone opened the door for a Turkish assault on Kurdish positions in northern Syria . U.S foreign policy under the Trump White House has lurched and zig-zagged across the delicate landscape of the Middle East. For President Trump, the U.S-Kurdish alliance against Islamic State was always to be a temporary alliance. The aim, in the context of the domestic politics, was to “bomb the s**t” out of Islamic State. For President Trump it was important to demonstrate, at face-value at least, that he could take a tougher stance on the Assad government and Islamic State then President Obama did.
President Trump’s stance on Syria has been much the same as his predecessor: rife with inconsistency, hesitancy and a reluctance to commit U.S military power to the Syrian battlefield. As with the international conflict in Bosnia in the 1990s, this has exacerbated the widespread carnage and ethnic cleansing destroying the country. For President Trump, the sole focus would be counter-terrorism in Syria, and the SDF were to be his pawns to get the job done to limit U.S involvement on the ground. The SDF were crucial in recapturing Raqqa and helping international special forces hunt down key leaders of Islamic State. [17]
The betrayal of the Syrian Kurds, however, seemed to be inevitable under President Trump’s leadership. The NewStatesman was writing about the consequences of the United States turning on Kurdish allies during the Kirkuk Crisis in November, 2017. [18] The Trump administration did little as Iraqi forces swept into the city of Kirkuk in Iraq and drove the peshmerga from the area as dozens of people were killed. ‘With a divided leadership, no allies abroad and without a military option,’ the Iraqi Kurds lost their autonomy established after the First Gulf War in 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. [19] Baghdad’s seizure of these hard-won gains came four months after the Iraqi forces, supported by the Kurdistan Regional Government, concluded their campaign to drive Islamic State from Iraq.
The Turkish government welcomed the developments, stating that maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq was paramount. Both Baghdad and Ankara had been alarmed by Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum in 2017 which would have stripped the Iraqi government of Kirkuk’s oil-rich land and precipitated the break-up of Iraq. [20] Turkey, hostile to the separatist and nationalist aspirations of specific Kurdish political and military groups were eager to see Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy snuffed out.
As with the Kirkuk Crisis in Iraq, betrayal came swiftly in Syria. Spring of Peace came seven months after the recapture of Baghouz, Islamic State’s final piece of territory in Syria. Olive Branch came four months after SDF and the YPG, supported by U.S airpower and artillery, drove Islamic State from Raqqa. The consequences of giving a green light to the Turkish government have been far more serious than the ones in Iraq. Where sectarian and ethnic divisions are waning in Iraq, they are on steroids in Syria after eight years of war, and while sectarian and ethnic fighting are not the only force driving Syria’s conflict, in Turkey’s war with Rojava, they have come to the fore.
The Rojavian experiment: Vox explains in 5 minutes
Ethnic Cleansing in Rojava?
In Spring of Peace and Olive Branch, allegations of ethnic cleansing by Turkish Armed Forces, or at-least the National Army have been levelled against Turkey. For security purposes or not, ethnic cleansing - the enforced deportation of a population - is a war crime. As the International Committee for the Red Cross describes, ‘Parties to an international armed conflict may not deport or forcibly transfer the civilian population of an occupied territory, in whole or in part, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand.’ [21] Turkish officials have argued that Islamic State, the YPG and PKK, labelled as terrorists justify the ‘imperative military reasons’ employed. Others ‘reasons’ alluded to have also ranged from preserving the territorial integrity of Turkey to fighting Islamic State in Syria. [22]
At face-value, the reasoning behind Turkish actions seem justifiable. However, it has oversimplified developments on the ground as demonstrated by Olive Branch. In 2018, 150,000 - 200,000 Syrian Kurds were displaced from the Afrin canton and Tel Rifaat during Olive Branch. [23]
For years, the Kurdish-majority Afrin canton in north-western Syria remained one of the few areas in the country which have not found them entangled in the whirlwind of the eight year long war in Syria. This situation changed on 20th January 2018 when the combined force of the Turkish Armed Forces and a collage of Syrian rebel groups financed by Turkey invaded the canton. Olive Branch was founded on debatable claims surrounding the existence of Islamic State fighters in Afrin. [24] The Turkish proxies, including the National Army, led the ground invasion supported by Turkish soldiers, artillery and armoured battalions as well as the Turkish Air Force. Their aim was to establish a 30km deep ‘safe-zone’, similar to the one being currently established in Spring of Peace.
On the fifty-third day of its offensive into the Afrin canton, Turkish forces inside Syria completed their encirclement of Afrin. According to Euro News, ninety villages including Afrin were surrounded. [25] Turkish airstrikes destroyed homes and others were systematically vandalised by Turkey’s Syrian paramilitary forces. Amnesty also reported property confiscation and the looting of homes and businesses and the 86 instances of arbitrary detention and forced disappearances. [26] As the assault on Afrin started, claims of ethnic cleansing started making headlines as the SDF and senior Kurdish officials began calling the international community to halt the Turkish campaign.
A video - verified as authentic by Syrian Observatory for Human Rights - demonstrates why the Syrian Kurds fear they cannot return to Afrin. Five men wearing body armour, four wearing bandannas are being filmed on mobile bearing Free Syrian Army insignias, threatening the Syrian Kurds with death if they refused to convert to their interpretation of Islam. The threats were not so different from the forced conversions of Yezidis and Christians undertaken by Islamic State or Al-Qa’ida. One young man in the film went on to say, “My message is for the infidel Kurds. By Allah, if you repent and come back to Allah, then know that you are our brothers. But if you refuse, then we see that your heads are ripe, and that it's time for us to pluck them." [27]
On 13th March, 2018, SDF Press published a video on Youtube, ‘Violations by the Turkish Invasion and the Terrorist Factions in Afrin’ detailing atrocities committed in Afrin during Olive Branch in January, 2018. Two videos were uploaded showing Turkish-backed rebels mutilating the corpses of a Yezidi YPG fighter in Qustal named Ahmad Muhamad Hanan and a Kurdish woman, Barin Kobani in a town called Qurna on the Turkish border. Barin, also fighting for the YPG, had been killed two weeks into the fighting. Another video emerged of several Turkish-backed rebels executing a civilian near Afrin after stealing his tractor. Similar atrocities have been picked on social media by analysts and journalists covering Spring of Peace. [28]
Pro-Turkish fighters also tore down a statue of the legendary Kurdish hero Kawa and raised the Turkish flag on rooftops in the city centre. In essence, similar to the Israelis seizure and occupation of the Golan Heights in 1967 during the Six Day War, with potential plans to annex the territory in the near-future, what we have seen in northern Syria is a land grab. Joshua Landis, director of the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Middle East Studies said in August, 2018 that “Turkey is prepared to, in a sense, quasi-annex this region.” [29]
Olive trees were hewn and torn to the ground to make space for military positions and eighty per cent of olives have started being exported to Turkey. [30] Commentators suggested that as part of this annexation process, Turkish forces were establishing military bases to cement their position in northern Syria and use land for peace to negotiate with President Assad and Russia on the refugee crisis.
“According to sources affiliated with the YPG, Turkish troops have established three bases in the village of Kakhara, as cited by Fars News Agency. The source also revealed that the Ankara forces have set up three more military bases one in Bish Baraq region West of Kakhara and the second one in Mount Nishan also known as Sarteh, while the third one has been established in the farms of Kazeh village located in Jandaris region. [31]
With the establishment of military bases on agricultural lands and the transfer of Syrian Arabs (predominantly Sunni) to Afrin, the canton is being demographically altered by the Turkish military and its proxies. The plan has been successful. '“The long-term problem for Turkey is whether they can do this kind of thing and have it accepted by the international community.” said Landis, “I think many Sunnis believe that they’d be better off with Turkey. And that’s really demonstrated in the fact that most of the rebel militias who use Turkey as a refuge also see Turkey as, in a sense, a mothership that supplies them with diplomatic support, political support, military support, economic support, everything. They see the Turks as champions of their Islamic identity. Turkey has a great interest in not allowing Assad to drive all of these tens of thousands of rebels [out]. They don’t want refugees. They already have 3.5 million registered inside Turkey. The [potential] trade that’s sitting there, and waiting to be done, is that if the Syrian government controls the Kurds, Turkey will withdraw from territory in [northern] Syria.” [32]
The fact that the Kurds in Afrin are predominantly Sunni mattered little to the Turkish proxies as noted by journalist Patrick Cockburn writes. ‘The Kurds in Afrin are Sunni Muslims, however, Islamic State and al-Qaeda traditionally punish those who fail to subscribe to their beliefs as heretics deserving death. Videos suggest that many are former Isis or al-Qaeda fighters who see the Kurds and non-Muslim minorities as enemies to be expelled or eradicated.’ [33] These changes to the demographic landscape were made easier because of the fears of Kurdish civilians. The New Humanitarian reported in March, 2018, that ‘many of the displaced civilians may be unwilling – perhaps unable – to live under Turkish control, especially given Ankara’s discriminatory policies against its own Kurdish minority. Kurdish women in Afrin were forced, in many cases, to accept second class citizenship and wear the hijab or niqab. [34]
Refugees who have arrived are changing the status quo. Numbering 35,000 so far, their families have been placed in or taken over Kurdish-owned houses and land abandoned by Syrian Kurds. The religious-political policy adopted against Kurdish women, who have historically taken an active part in politics, is a step to suppress the Kurds culture. BBC Syria producer, Riam Dalati, published a voice recording by the Head of Security for the Free Syrian Army’s 23rd Division who recommended the mass-expulsion of male Kurds between ages 15-50, a last resort to assassinations and attacks being conducted by the YPG. [35] Recorded on social media on Twitter, the threat has been matched by demographic adjustments to the population.
Road-blocks and checkpoints, photographed by Beha el Halebi showed paramilitary men manning them, allowing people in and out of the city. Many families, predominantly Syrian Kurds were not allowed to return to Afrin. Instead, many families displaced by President Assad’s final assault on the predominantly Sunni enclave of eastern Ghouta - the Damascus suburb under siege for years - have been resettled in Afrin. This has been opposed by some military men fighting in the Free Syrian Army, but represent a small percentage of those against these measures. The new families being settled there, according to Sara Kiyyali, a researcher for Human Rights Watch speaking to Syria Direct, many are not happy with taking the homes of those who have been displaced. “A lot of those houses are empty right now,” she said to Syria Direct this month. “They were primarily Kurdish residents...[and many] are uncomfortable returning to live under Turkish control.” [37] Refugees from Homs and Yarmouk, centres of heavy fighting between Assad and the rebels, also arrived in Afrin.
Under the military occupation of the Turkish Armed Forces and its Syrian proxies, watering down the population of Syrian Kurds, and installing more pro-Turkish proxies in towns along the Syrian-Turkey border to Erdogan and the upper echelons of Turkish power in Ankara, secures the Turkish border from the YPG and cuts off support for the PKK, both regarded as terrorist organisations. Returning an Arab rather than a Kurdish enclave to President Assad is preferred to have the YPG and SDF on Turkey’s doorstep.
The consequences have reshaped Afrin’s social and ethnic layout. “It’s not the Afrin we know,” said Areen, 34. “Too many strange faces. Businesses have been taken over by the Syrians, stores changed to Damascene names, properties gone. We feel like the Palestinians.” [38] she said while being interviewed by Martin Chulov for The Guardian. Another civilian, Salah Mohammed, from Afrin similarly asserted that Syrian Kurds could not return. “Lands are being confiscated, farms, wheat, furniture, nothing is ours anymore; it’s us versus their guns. It’s difficult to come back, you have to prove the property is yours and get evidence and other nearly impossible papers to reclaim it.There is definitely a demographic change, a lot of Kurds have been forcibly displaced on the count that they’re with the PKK when in fact they weren’t. There are barely any Kurds left in Afrin, no one is helping us go back.” [39]
The actions of the Turkish army across northern Syria appears to be a calculated policy of eviction, driven by political agendas and discriminatory practices against the Kurds. The paramilitaries are doing the Turkish military’s dirty work as they carve out a Syrian enclave more loyal to Ankara than to the YPG and PKK. “The Turkish soldiers are behaving decently,” a Syrian Kurd told The Economist, “But the bearded ones are big trouble,” he adds, referring to the Free Syrian Army and National Army supported by Turkey. “They’ve stolen so much.” [40] In interviews with The New Humanitarian, Arat Sik, 30, described the aftermath of the battle of Afrin, the situation seemed bleaker. “Airstrikes destroyed our house, and then they stole everything we had,” said the former resident of Afrin. “We can never go back.”
The blueprint used in Afrin has been replicated in 2019 in Spring of Peace. The Washington Post, The New Yorker, BBC and The Guardian have accused Turkey’s Syrian allies of conducting blowback of war crimes committed in the cantons remaining under the YPG and SDF. Many of these war crimes have been uploaded to social media by fighters. 170,000 Syrian Kurds have fled the war zone in northern Syria, and there is no clear indication when they will be allowed to return. “This means ethnic cleansing by removing the Kurds from their land and replacing them with some others,” said General Mazloum Kobani Abdi, a leader in the YPG. The ‘others’ the general refers to are the refugees who remain in Turkey. Turkey now hosts the world’s largest community of Syrians displaced by the ongoing civil war in their country, and the solution, as with Lebanon’s policy for refugees is to send them back, whatever the consequences and costs to those who are repatriated and those who are dislodged, in this case thousands of Syrian Kurds, to house returnees.
Image via @DefenseUnits
The consequences of this Turkish operation will go further than the ethnic cleansing campaign. With the SDF no longer guarding displacement camps where Islamic State prisoners of war and families were detained, the group could regain its capacity to conduct major terrorist attacks across the region, even without the presence of deceased leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. In a twist of irony, it was SDF intelligence which helped the Trump administration locate their number one target in Syria as Baghdadi’s death came a mere two weeks after Trump left the SDF, YPG and the Syrian Kurds to their fate.
The fall out of Spring of Peace encapsulates America’s debacle in Syria. By sanctifying Erdogan’s border war turned full-fledged military intervention, it has allowed operations such as Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Spring of Peace to evolve into ethnic cleansing, an action which has altered the demography of northern Syria. Where President Obama was inconsistent in the face of atrocities in the Syrian War, President Trump has turned a blind-eye to state-sponsored ethnic cleansing in northern Syria. The meek responses of both presidents and the wider international community will haunt Syria for generations.
Abandoning the Syrian Kurds, one of the more reliable factions fighting in the war and an key ally, is pushing them into the arms of Assad and solidifying his victory while empowering extremist groups in the region. By strengthening their hand, it is the Syrian people who pay the ultimate price now and in the future.
Orwa Ajjoub is an affiliated researcher at the center for Middle Eastern Studies in Lund university. In 2018, Orwa graduated from the same institution where he defended his Master’s thesis which looks at the theological aspect of the split between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in 2013. Although his interest has been mainly focused on Salafi-Jihadi groups in the Middle East, Orwa wrote some articles about the Syrian society during the war and particularly about Syrian LGBTQ in Europe. His work was published on different media websites such as Syria Deeply, Huffington Post and World Policy. During the last two years, Orwa has participated in two academic conferences where he discussed al-Qaeda presence in Syria. In addition to writing journalistic articles, Orwa is currently working on an academic report discussing the future menace of the Islamic state and other Salafi-Jihadi groups such al-Qaeda.
Editor of The Conflict Archives and an aid worker at Action Against Hunger, Matthew has done freelance writing and journalism in Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon and post-conflict Balkans. He has also worked for several human rights and charity organisations including Amnesty International, Action Against Hunger, Aegis Trust, Protection Approaches and STAND. Matthew has had his work published by several papers and blogs including The Times, Osservatorio Mashrek, and Strife and has interviewed several academics, activists, government officials and refugees on crises in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. He is writing a draft for his first book: The Syrian Nakba: The Assad’s regime’s war for the Middle East
REFERENCES
[1] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-opposition-armed-groups-merge-amid-looming-turkish-offensive-syria
[2] Erdogan says Syria operation aimed at IS jihadists, Kurdish PYD. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3756119/Erdogan-says-Syria-operation-aimed-IS-jihadists-Kurdish-PYD.html
[3] Operation Euphrates Shield: Implementation and lessons learned. SETA: Foundation for Political Economic and Social research. https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/2017/11/R97_Euphrates.pdf
[4] Aron Lund, The Free Syrian Army does not Exist. https://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-free-syrian-army-doesnt-exist/ 2013.
[5] Turkey in North western, Syrian Rebuilding empire at the margins, Netherland Clingendael Institute of International relation. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/PB_Turkey_in_Northwestern_Syria_June_2019.pdf
[6] Ali el Yassir, The Sham Legion: Syria’s Moderate Islamists, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55344?lang=en
[7] Aron Lund, The Levant Front: Can Aleppo’s Rebels Unite?, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/57605?lang=en
[8] Arslon Xudosi, Syrian Turkmen Groups in Latakia: An Overview, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/02/07/syrian-turkmen-groups-in-latakia-an-overview/ 2019
[9] "غصن الزيتون".. معركة لاستعادة عفرين, https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/military/2018/1/22/غصن-الزيتون-معركة-لاستعادة-عفرين
[10] Syria's Idlib to take center stage in Turkey, Russia, Iran talks. https://www.dw.com/en/syrias-idlib-to-take-center-stage-in-turkey-russia-iran-talks/a-50438070
[11] 11 فصيلاً عسكرياً يتوحدون تحت اسم "الجبهة الوطنية للتحرير", https://www.syria.tv/11-فصيلاً-عسكرياً-يتوحدون-تحت-اسم-الجبهة-الوطنية-للتحرير
[12] https://twitter.com/EHSANI22/status/1181957745861447686
[13] For more about HTS, see Orwa Ajjoub, From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, what has changed?. http://theconflictarchives.com/insights/2019/5/29/from-al-nusra-to-hayat-tahrir-sham
[14] Sultan Al Kanj Reviewing the Turkey–HTS Relationship, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/reviewing-the-turkey-hts-relationship
[15] International Crisis Group Report, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/197-best-bad-options-syrias-idlib
[16] Martin Churlov, “Iran repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime's control" The Guardian, 14th January, 2017. Accessed October 29th, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/13/irans-syria-project-pushing-population-shifts-to-increase-influence
[17] Bethan Mckernan, “Isis defeated, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces announce,” The Guardian, 23rd March, 2019. Accessed October 29th 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/isis-defeated-us-backed-syrian-democratic-forces-announce
[18] Bernard-Henri Levy, “The U.S will rue its betrayal of the Kurds,” The NewStatesman, 11th November, 2017. Accessed October 29th, 2019. https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2017/11/us-will-rue-its-betrayal-kurds
[19] Patrick Cockburn, “How the Kurds lost Iraq: 'They had tanks and planes and we had no chance,” The Independent, 31st October, 2019. Accessed October 29th 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-kurds-defeat-war-battle-independence-how-they-lost-a8030081.html
[20] Tom Wescott, “In Iraqi Kurdistan, reality bites as independence dream fades,” The New Humanitarian, 26th September, 2019. Accessed October 29th, 2019. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2019/09/26/Iraq-Kurdistan-independence-Peshmerga
[21] Rule 129. The Act of Displacement, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule129
[22] Ahmet S. Yayla & Colin P. Clarke, “Turkey’s Double ISIS Standard,” Foreign Policy, 12th April, 2018. Accessed October, 29th, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/12/turkeys-double-isis-standard/
[23] Umut Uras, “Turkish agency says tonnes of aid sent to Afrin during operation,” Al Jazeera, 19th March, 2018. Accessed October, 29th 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/turkey-delivers-30-tonnes-aid-afrin-operation-syria-180319114124037.html
[24] Patrick Cockburn, “Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria,” 7th February, 2019. Accessed October, 29th 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-isis-afrin-syria-kurds-free-syrian-army-jihadi-video-fighters-recruits-a8199166.html
[25] Natalie Huet, “Turkish army encircles Syria's Afrin,” Euro News, 13th March, 2019. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2018/03/13/turkish-army-encircles-syria-s-afrin
[26] Syria: Turkey must stop serious violations by allied groups and its own forces in Afrin, Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/syria-turkey-must-stop-serious-violations-by-allied-groups-and-its-own-forces-in-afrin/
[27] Patrick Cockburn, “Yazidis who suffered under Isis face forced conversion to Islam amid fresh persecution in Afrin,” The Independent, 18th April, 2018. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-yazidis-isis-islam-conversion-afrin-persecution-kurdish-a8310696.html
[28] Twitter, GRAPHIC: Turkish-backed rebels executing a civilian in #Afrin after looting his tractor - https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/966754047930912768?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E966754047930912768&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fanfenglish.com%2Frojava%2Fturkish-state-s-savagery-in-afrin-25088
[29] Madeline Edwards, “As Syria’s proxies converge on Idlib, what’s next for Turkey’s northern state-within-a-state?,” Syria Direct, 6th August, 2018. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://syriadirect.org/news/as-syria%E2%80%99s-proxies-converge-on-idlib-what%E2%80%99s-next-for-turkey%E2%80%99s-northern-state-within-a-state/
[30] James Badcock, “Turkey accused of plundering olive oil from Syria to sell in the EU,” The Telegraph, 14th January, 2019. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/01/14/turkey-accused-plundering-olive-oil-syria-sell-eu/
[31] BasNews, “Turkish Forces Establish Military Bases in Syria's Afrin: Report,” http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/439014
[32] Edwards, “As Syria’s proxies converge on Idlib, what’s next for Turkey’s northern state-within-a-state?,” https://syriadirect.org/news/as-syria%E2%80%99s-proxies-converge-on-idlib-what%E2%80%99s-next-for-turkey%E2%80%99s-northern-state-within-a-state/
[33] Patrick Cockburn, “Syria's war of ethnic cleansing: Kurds threatened with beheading by Turkey's allies if they don't convert to extremism,” The Independent, 12th March, 2018. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-civil-war-assad-regime-turkey-afrin-kurds-eastern-ghouta-us-allies-militia-a8252456.html
[34] Patrick Cockburn, “Kurdish women protest after being told by Turkish-backed militias to wear the hijab,” The Independent, 14th June, 2018. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/kurdish-woman-hijab-protest-turkey-militia-force-a8399206.html
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ammar Hamou & Barrett Limoges, “Seizing lands from Afrin’s displaced Kurds, Turkish-backed militias offer houses to East Ghouta families,” Syria Direct, 1st May, 2018. Accessed 29th October, 2018. https://syriadirect.org/news/seizing-lands-from-afrin%E2%80%99s-displaced-kurds-turkish-backed-militias-offer-houses-to-east-ghouta-families/
[37] Martin Chulov, 'Nothing is ours anymore': Kurds forced out of Afrin after Turkish assault,” The Guardian, 7th June, 2018. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/07/too-many-strange-faces-kurds-fear-forced-demographic-shift-in-afrin
[38] Ibid.
[39] “Turkey struggles to keep the peace in Afrin,” The Economist, 19th July, 2018. Accessed 29th October, 2019. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/07/19/turkey-struggles-to-keep-the-peace-in-afrin
[40] Afshin Ismaeli, “After Afrin: No Safe Haven,” The New Humanitarian, 3rd April, 2018. Accessed 29th October 2019. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/photo-feature/2018/04/03/after-afrin-no-safe-haven