“Israeli intelligence got it wrong”: Inside Hamas’s bloody assault on Israel

Photo Credit: Resistance News Network via Telegram

On October 7th, Hamas launched a brutal surprise attack from land, air and sea into southern Israel cutting a swathe through Israeli communities. The death toll is mounting with over 1,200 Israelis reported killed and thousands more wounded making the attack one of the bloodiest in the country’s history. The Israeli army has responded in force, pounding the Gaza Strip with airstrikes and killing over a thousand Palestinians so far.

More than 300,000 reservists have been called up for a military campaign that will strike deep into one of the most densely populated areas on the planet. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has formed an emergency unity government as the crisis has escalated and security forces reel from a catastrophic intelligence failure that allowed Hamas militants to strike deep into southern Israel. With the crisis escalating, Dr Ahron Bregman, one of the foremost experts on the Arab-Israeli conflict and an academic in the War Studies Department at King’s College London, explains Hamas’s assault on Israel and what it means for the Middle East.


Why did Hamas launch this brutal attack now? 

There are three main reasons why Hamas decided to strike at Israel, even though none of these reasons justify its brutal behaviour. First, Hamas is in competition with Abu Mazen's Fatah and is keen to impress on fellow Palestinians that it does more to fight the Israeli occupation than the leadership in the West Bank. Second, reports of US attempts to broker a peace deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia concern Hamas as they feel that Palestinians are being abandoned by Arab governments. Their plan was: we strike at Israel, and Israel hits back causing many Palestinian casualties which, in turn, will make it difficult for the Saudis to sign a deal.

Third, Hamas could see a recent divide opening up in Israeli society as Benjamin Netanyahu’s government attempts to bring in reforms which could reduce the power of the judiciary. This initiative by the Israeli government has led to massive demonstrations in Israel and led to open declarations by military reservists that they would refuse to serve in the military if the government proceeded with the reforms. 

On top of these reasons, the current Netanyahu government, the most extreme in Israel’s history, with militant settlers holding key governmental positions, kept provoking the Palestinians. All these elements, namely Palestinian frustrations, competition between different Palestinian factions, and the perception within Hamas that Israel was vulnerable, led to its decision to strike into southern Israel.


What will the latest war in Gaza look like?

The Israelis will hit the Gaza Strip from the air, which they have already started doing. This will hit Hamas's military strength and convince the Palestinian population to move out of the way and concentrate in the centre and southern areas of Gaza. Israeli ground forces will then move in, mainly into areas in the northern sectors of the Gaza Strip. The aim, I believe, will be to hit hard at the military capabilities of Hamas, though not necessarily to topple it.


What will the consequences of the attack carry for Netanyahu’s government, and a deeply divided Israeli society?  

It is likely that soon we will see a larger government which includes elements of the opposition in it. It will send a clear message to a divided Israeli society that the political leadership is putting aside their differences and concentrating instead on the war. Such an emergency larger government is also needed as, in the opposition, there are people like Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot who have military experience and could help direct the war. 


Do you think Hezbollah will be drawn into war, and how will that change the dynamics of the conflict in Gaza? Can Israel win a protracted war on two fronts?

Officials in Israel will hope that Hezbollah keeps out, although there are some experts who believe that now is the time to strike at Hezbollah and remove the threat in Lebanon. If Hezbollah does join the war, whether intentionally or as a result of a miscalculation, then the Israelis will concentrate their efforts on Hezbollah first, putting the war in Gaza on hold. After hitting Hezbollah they will then return to the Gaza front. Traditionally, Israel tries to avoid fighting simountensouly on two fronts.  


How did Israeli intelligence fail to anticipate the attack, given there’s been a spike in violence in Palestinian occupied territories this year? 

As with the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli intelligence failed in its mission to warn of the coming Hamas attack. In the lead-up to the assualt, intelligence agencies did have all the necessary information and data indicating that Hamas was about to strike. The problem, however, is that they clung to a set of beliefs - "Hamas doesn't want war". "Hamas is weak", and so on. Obviously, they got it wrong.