Beginning in April 2019, the Assad forces supported by the Russian air jets has launched its fierce military offensive on Idlib and its countryside, as the city represents the last bastion of the Islamist armed opposition in the country. In reaction, two military rooms of operations were formed by the armed factions in northwest Syria. ‘Harid al-Muʾminyn’ or ‘Incite the Believers,’ which includes hardline al-Qaeda (AQ) loyal groups such as Hurras al-Din and other three groups namely: Ansar al-Din, Ansar al-Tawhid and Ansar al-Islam. The second room is ‘Al-fateh al-Mubin’ or ‘The Clear Conquest’ which consists of Turkey’s funded groups such as the National Liberation Front and Jaysh al-Izzeh, as well as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS.

At the same time, HTS announced through its Salivation government the formation of saraya al-Muqawama al-Shaʿbiya, Popular Resistance Brigades or cells (PRBs). These are civilian based ‘independent’ military entities with the goal of fighting Assad along with other factions regardless of their political and ideological affiliation. While the decision to recruit civilians to perform military activities probably resulted from the need to replenish the opposition forces, the idea of forming such a popular resistance movement has its roots in the writings of the well-known jihadi strategist Abu Mus‘ab  al-Suri.  

In his book ‘The Global Islamic Resistance Call’, written in 2004, al-Suri argues that for the jihadi movement to succeed it must establish a popular Islamic resistance which includes the  “complete participation of all sects of the (Muslim) population with its multiple diverse groups.”[1] Al-Suri’s theory of establishing popular resistance, however, is more complex and well-developed than the formation of the PRB of HTS. To adapt to the tight security conditions resulting from the ‘war on terror’ and the loss of Afghanistan as a safe haven for centralized jihadi groups such as AQ, al-Suri suggests what he termed nizam la tanzim or ‘system, not organization’. This means forming small, autonomous and secretive jihadi brigades or cells—made up from as little as one member—with shared ideological beliefs and the goal of carrying out jihad, and without organizational ties to each other. Creating saraya al-Muqawama al-Islamya al-ʿalamiya or Islamic Global Resistance Brigades (IGRBs) is what al-Suri considers to be the recipe for success, as it opens the door for individual jihad with a global reach, while avoiding the surveillance of intelligence agencies.

PRB, on the other hand, is “a voluntarily revolutionary public movement which aims to reorganize both financial and human resources from locals, internally displaced people and tribes,” according to its statement of declaration. Although PRBs allegedly comprise self-funded and self-trained entities, making them similar to IGRBs in this regard, they do not share their secretive nature. HTS, which severed its ties with both IS and AQ in 2013 and 2017 respectively, has distanced itself from global jihadism, which perceives the West as the main target. It has, therefore, no reason to operate clandestinely given the West remains outside of its agenda.

As ‘grassroots’ movements, PRBs have managed, within a short period of time, to reach the civil and tribal communities in most HTS-held territories. Throughout May and June, the PRB Telegram channel released dozens of videos featuring armed notables and tribe leaders—from Idlib, Aleppo, the surrounding countryside and other areas—announcing the formation of its subcommittees. Additionally, PRBs took part and organized two military related campaigns namely: ’Haṣen baladak’ or ‘Fortify Your Country’ and ‘jahid bi-nafsek’ or ‘Perform Jihad with Yourself’.[2] Whereas the first one focused on the logistical aspect by preparing sandbags and digging trenches to consolidate the fronts, the latter was an open invitation for civilians to join jihad themselves and was promoted by jihadi clerics affiliated with HTS such as Abu Maria al-Qahtani and Abu al-Fateh al-Farghali.

Interestingly, one of the videos released by the Telegram channel showed a group of fully veiled women emphasizing the role of Muslim women throughout Islamic history and confirming the support of the ‘free women’ for jihad and the establishment of the PRBs.[3] HTS’s nominal but public acknowledgment of the women’s role in the conflict, combined with its willingness to involve them in the public sphere, place the group distinctively outside AQ’s orbit. 

Although the PRBs’ name does not carry any jihadi reference, the religious justification for establishing it, as well as the language of their declaration, tell otherwise. “The goal behind forming the PRB is to practice al-wajib or the religious duty of repelling the brutal offensive of Assad and the Iranian militias and to preserve the religion, dignity and land,” stated the men featured in the videos declaring the formation of the subcommittees of the PRB. [4]

Theologically, only defensive jihad, which is applied when the enemies of Muslims attack a Muslim country or city, or if they gain control of a Muslim country, is wajib a religious duty imposed by God on every Muslim. Moreover, most of the videos announcing the establishment of PRB subcommunities begin with the following Quranic verse:

“Go you forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and your persons, in the Cause of Allah. That is best for you, if you (but) knew.” (Quran 9:41)

The same verse is commonly cited by Jihadi-Salafi ideologues to incite Muslims to pursue defensive jihad. Al-Suri contended the Muslim Umma faces both external and internal enemies, the former represented by the ‘American crusaders’ and their allies, while the latter includes ‘apostate’ Muslim rulers. Jihad under these circumstances is defensive and requires Muslims to fully sacrifice their goods and themselves, as the verse states.[5]

Another concept that both PRBs and IGRBs give significance to is hareb al-Mustadʿafyn, or the war of the underdogs. This is a category of Muslims that has been oppressed and ill-treated by the enemies of Islam. Through their declaration statement, the PRBs affirm that their jihad is carried out for the sake of Allah and to support the underdogs. Similarly, in his book al-Suri asserts that after spreading the call of Islam and protecting its abode, the goal of jihad is to save the (Muslim) underdogs. While the PRB statement does say much about the war of the underdogs, in his book al-Suri delves into its details, not only as religious concept but also as a theory of warfare for his IGRBs. The war of the underdog, in al-Suri’s dictionary, is synonymous to guerrilla war tactics which jihadi groups should rely on as a bedrock of their military activities.[6] Furthermore, he authored a hefty book of as much as 1000 pages, in which he discusses and explains Robert Taber’s book ‘War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare’.[7] Drawing on Taber’s work, which serves as a manual for conducting guerrilla warfare, al-Suri argues that the IGRB’s training should rest on guerrilla tactics in order to be able to face its enemy.

The resemblance between JN’s ideology and al-Suri’s writings even led some to suggest that JN founder and leader al-Jolani was al-Suri himself. In November 2013, when al-Jolani’s identity had not yet been disclosed, the Lebanese journalist Hazem al-Amin wrote an article for the Al-Hayat newspaper, in which he suggested that: “It is useful and amusing to risk claiming that the author of the unpublished document, upon which Al-Qaeda in Iraq commissioned Abu Muhammad al-Jolani to establish Al- Nusra Front -supposedly written by al-Jolani - is none other than Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri.”[8] Al-Amin’s claim was based on analysing the latter document and comparing it with al-Suri’s famous book ‘Al-Mas’ala al- Suriyyah’ or ‘The Syrian Question’. The similarities between the two documents, argued al-Amin, in terms of language, strength of expressions and the encyclopaedic knowledge in wars, combined with almost the same grammatical mistakes both documents included suggest that almost certainly al-Suri had authored them. Regardless of the fact that al-Jolani turned out to be a different person, al-Suri’s writings have shaped JN’s code of conduct towards local community, strategy and its application of jihad. 

To understand the situation in Idlib and how HTS, which is the hegemonic group in northwest Syria, has adapted and will continue to adapt to the changing political reality and military developments, it might be helpful to look back to al-Suri’s writings, whose intellectual influence on al-Jolani cannot be overstated. Both PRBs and IGRBs are supposedly autonomous and acknowledge the theological ruling of jihad as being defensive. The slim difference between them in terms of secrecy, however, is only a proof for HTS’s adaptive nature resulting from al-Jolani’s pragmatism. This pragmatism is shared between al-Jolani and al-Suri. Brynjar Lia, who authored an authoritative work on al-Suri,[9] describes him as ‘"a critic and an intellectual" who puts "hard-nosed realism before religious wish-fulfillment and pragmatic long-term strategies before utopianism.[10]

Orwa Ajjoub is an affiliated researcher at the center for Middle Eastern Studies in Lund university. In 2018, Orwa graduated from the same institution where he defended his Master’s thesis which looks at the theological aspect of the split between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in 2013. Although his interest has been mainly focused on Salafi-Jihadi groups in the Middle East, Orwa wrote some articles about the Syrian society during the war and particularly about Syrian LGBTQ in Europe. His work was published on different media websites such as Syria Deeply, Huffington Post and World Policy. During the last two years, Orwa has participated in two academic conferences where he discussed al-Qaeda presence in Syria. In addition to writing journalistic articles, Orwa is currently working on an academic report discussing the future menace of the Islamic state and other Salafi-Jihadi groups such al-Qaeda.

Footnotes

[1] Abu Mus‘ab  al-Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, p 846. For more about al-Suri, see Brynjar Lia, ‘Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri.’

[2] The General conference for ‘jahid bi-nafsek’ campaigns. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=js1rcBV4ItA

[3]  The Free women’s solidarity with saraya al-Muqawama al-Shaʿbiya, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQJLZL6Sflk

[4] Announcing the formation of Bani Khaled tribe’s brigade. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNY4i6GgDLE

[5] There are two types pf jihad: offensive and defensive. While the former occurs when Muslims launch an offensive attack against their enemies and requires a rightful authority, such as the Caliph, to sanction it, the latter is applied when Muslims’ enemy attacks upon a country or city belonging to the Muslims or if it gains control of a Muslim country. Additionally, while defensive jihad is fard ayn (obligatory for all Muslims), offensive jihad is fard kifayah which means that if one group of Muslims fulfils the obligation then it is sufficient on behalf of all Muslims. If there are no Muslims fulfilling this obligation, then everyone is considered sinful.

[6] Ibid, p 1423

[7] Abu Mus‘ab  al-Suri, Sharih hareb al-Mustadʿafyn, Explaining the war of the underdogs.

[8] Hazem al-Amin, “Wathiqa ‘an “al-Harb al-Marghouba” bayna “Da‘esh”

wa al-Nitham,” (Lit., A Document about the “Desired War” between “ISIS” and

the Regime), Al-Hayat Newspaper, November 9, 2013.

[9] Brynjar Lia, ‘Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri.’

[10] David Samuels, The New Mastermind of Jihad, The Wall Street Journal, 2012. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577323750859163544