Matthew Williams

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Is a man-hunt for Syria's war criminals possible in the “Age of Impunity”?


“We have seen impunity throughout history,” said, David Miliband, CEO of the International Rescue Committee, speaking at the Fulbright Lecture in June 2019. “Today’s Age of Impunity represents a deviation from the ten-year period after the 1990s, when accountability, not impunity, was on the rise. Those engaged in conflicts around the world – and there are many – believe they can get away with anything, including murder.”[1] 

Nowhere better defines the “Age of Impunity” than Syria’s international conflict. Crimes against humanity have not only been conducted, but they have also been showcased distributed across cyberspace by extremists, most notoriously by Islamic State soldiers and Bashar Assad’s paramilitaries such as the ‘Tiger Forces’. Others have been diligently photographed by Assad’s prison wardens, and meticulously recorded in emails and government documents. Syria’s brutality has been live-streamed to a global audience.[2] In terms of evidence - according to war crimes prosecutor Stephen Rapp - there hasn’t been a stronger case since Nazi Germany during the Second World War. 

Several actors involved in Syria’s war have committed crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing and genocide in Syria and Iraq. Journalist Julian Borger admitted that ‘in the face of slaughter in Syria and Iraq, the International Criminal Court has been powerless’ in holding those committing major atrocities to account in the eight-year war.[3]

The limp response of the international community has not stopped countries and charities coordinating to start a limited man-hunt for war criminals. On 13th February 2019, German and French police arrested two Syrian intelligence officers, Eyad Al-Omar and Anwar Raslan in Berlin and Rhineland-Palatinate state for crimes against humanity.[4] Five months previously, a German court sentenced a Syrian opposition member, Ibrahim A for committing war crimes in Aleppo.[5]

German authorities have been clear that Assad’s inner circle is not immune. An arrest warrant was issued by the German authorities for Jamil Hassan, previously head of the Syrian Air Force intelligence, in June 2018.[6] This warrant was ‘a milestone towards justice and accountability for all those affected by Assad’s torture system.’[7] A week after the arrest of Al-Omar and Raslan, Germany and the United States requested that Lebanese officials extradite Hassan after being admitted to a hospital in Beirut under the protection of Hezbollah. This request was refused. 

The obstacle to bringing Assad’s war criminals to justice, as Hassan’s case demonstrates, is that Syria is a battleground for regional and global powers. To remove Assad’s political armour will require diplomacy and soft-power were sanctions, military posturing and airstrikes have largely failed to affect Assad’s position in Syria or that of his allies. Iran and Russia, and Assad’s allies in government, hard-line and moderate, have clear political and economic stakes on Assad’s survival.

Reaching Assad and other key individuals such as Jamil Hassan, Maher Assad, Muhammad Nasif, Hafez Makhlouf, and Atef Najib - who are responsible for some of Syria’s worst crimes against humanity - will require accepting that the Ba’athist government will have to remain in power. This will mean covertly communicating with local and regional allies who threw their weight behind Assad’s circle during the civil war. 

Russia, Hezbollah and Iran know staying indefinitely carries risk both militarily and politically. Syrian politics is resistant to prolonged foreign interference and intervention. Before and during Syria’s war, there was considerable disquiet amongst government loyalists about Bashar Assad’s entrenchment in Hezbollah and Iran’s sphere of influence. In the 1950s and 1960s, when Egypt and Syria briefly unified and formed the United Arab Republic, Syrian military officers eventually revolted against Egyptian officers installed by General Abd’ Al-Nasser because they felt they held too much influence in Syrian politics.

A similar situation could develop if Iranian officers, Russia and Hezbollah engrain too deeply into Syria’s political and military fabric. It will not only breed resentment in defeated rebel enclaves, but it could also alienate Assad from the government and military officials and paramilitary groups who threw their support behind him in the civil war. The Assad regime is not homogeneous, there are multiple competing interests in the loyalist camp which can be exploited.

These potential weaknesses can only be exploited if the Western and Middle Eastern powers opposed to Assad’s rule are willing to negotiate and compromise with its enemies, specifically Syria, Iran and Hezbollah when the time arrives. With the current Trump administration showing a preference for draconian sanctions and military posturing across the region, this cannot happen yet.

Regional allies could also be an impediment to a solution to removing Assad. For example, the Gulf States were willing to sponsor different armed groups in the Syrian uprising against Assad but they fell short of wanting a full-fledged democracy to emerge in Damascus. The emergence of a democracy, they feared, would embolden those who wished to bring down monarchical rule.

The political will to engage with military and political officials in the current Syrian regime, Iran, and Russia hold the keys to bringing the Syrian government’s war criminals to some form of justice in the future. The West and its regional allies must be ready, and willing - through carrot and stick - to ply Assad’s key allies away from him through diplomatic back-channels and work with both the Syrian government (in secret) and opposition (in secret) to weaken Assad’s power. 

Alongside local actions, the West must also guarantee Iranian and Russian interests in Syria and balance Moscow and Tehran’s needs with the interests of their allies, particularly the Israelis and the Gulf States. It is only when these regional rivalries are untangled and resolved that an opportunity to remove Assad could emerge and bring leading war criminals in the loyalist and rebel camps to justice. There is hope, but these efforts, sadly, could take decades to accomplish, and as Syria’s catastrophe has tragically demonstrated, Assad will not go quietly now or in the future.


[1] “The new arrogance of power: Global politics in the age of impunity,” 21st June, 2019, accessed August 16, 2019, https://www.rescue.org/press-release/new-arrogance-power-global-politics-age-impunity.

[2] “Live Streaming Syria: Bambuser’s Hans Eriksson,” 17th January, 2013, accessed August 16, 2019, https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2013/01/17/live-streaming-syria-bambusers-hans-eriksson.

[3] Borger, Julian, The Butcher’s Trail: How the Search for Balkan War Criminals Became The World’s Most Successful Manhunt (2017) (New York: Other Press), p.323.

[4] Kate Collony, “Germany arrests two Syrians suspected of crimes against humanity,” The Guardian, 13th February, 2019, accessed August 19, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/13/germany-arrests-two-suspected-syrian-secret-service-officers.

[5] Stephanie Halasz and Sarah El Sirgany, “Germany convicts member of Western-backed Syrian opposition for 'war crimes,’” CNN, September, 2018, accessed August 19, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/09/25/middleeast/german-syrian-conviction-intl/index.html.

[6] Anchal, Vohra, “Germany 'seeks extradition' of Syria's Jamil Hassan from Lebanon,” Al Jazeera, 23rd February, 2019, accessed August 19th, 2019.

[7] “German authorities issue arrest warrant against Jamil Hassan, Head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence,” ECCHR, accessed August 19, 2019. https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/german-authorities-issue-arrest-warrant-against-jamil-hassan-head-of-the-syrian-air-force-intellige/.